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1 Introduction
In this era of globalization, it has become increasingly common for firms to outsource their
required inputs rather than produce them in-house. While many factors influence a firm’s
decision to outsource (see, e.g., Jarillo, 1993; Domberger, 1998 for a discussion of these
factors), it can be argued that outsourcing is primarily driven by cost considerations. A firm
will choose to outsource if the input supplier can offer a price that is lower than the firm’s
in-house cost. This will be the case if the supplier has a cost advantage in one or more factors
of production. Such advantages can be interpreted broadly as the supplier having a superior
production technology. For example, the supplier may be able to hire skilled labour at a
relatively low wage or it may possess advanced machineries. It is therefore plausible that
transfer of technology across firms could be a viable alternative to outsourcing. In fact, like
outsourcing, technology transfers have grown substantially in recent years (see, e.g., Mendi,
2005; Vishwasrao, 2007).1 As outsourcing and technology transfer generally serve the same
purpose (i.e., enabling one firm to use the cost-efficient production process of another firm),
a natural question is, what would make firms choose one of these contracts over another?
There could be different possible reasons to prefer outsourcing. For instance, the superior
technology may be labour intensive and difficult to transfer due to imperfect mobility of
labour. Additionally, transfer of technology may involve large initial investments that firms
may want to avoid. On the other hand, under technology transfer, a firm produces its inputs
in-house using the superior technology which gives it complete control over its production.
This will be preferred by a firm if it has a higher quality standard or if it wants to avoid the
risk of relying on another firm for its inputs.
Apart from the reasons given above, strategic considerations play an important role in
determining the nature of input production decisions of a firm. The strategic motive will be
particularly dominant when the input-seeking firm competes with the supplier in the final
good market. This paper aims to shed light on these strategic aspects in a model of price
competition. Specifically, we consider a Hotelling duopoly with two firms, A and B, who
are located at the end points of the unit interval in the final good market ϕ. Consumers are
uniformly distributed in this interval and have to incur transportation costs for traveling to
the end points. Any consumer buys one unit of ϕ from either A or B, or chooses a specific
outside option. We carry out our analysis under two alternative scenarios: the case of the
covered market where all consumers buy from either A or B, and the case of the uncovered
market where some consumers do not buy from either of these firms and instead choose the
outside option. We employ the Hotelling model, because it is versatile in that it has multiple
interpretations that apply to diverse economic situations as illustrated below.2
When the outside option is sufficiently unappealing, it is not optimal for consumers to
choose that option. This can correspond to a situation where the good produced by firms
A and B is an essential good for the consumers. Accordingly, any consumer will buy the
1For example, commenting on international technology transfer by U.S. firms, Vishwasrao (2007, p.
742-743) points out: “...in 2002, U.S. companies collected $29,023 million in royalties and fees from their
foreign subsidiaries and an additional $12,075 million in royalties and fees from unaffiliated firms in foreign
countries. These receipts have roughly doubled over the last decade. For 2002, the royalty and fee receipts
of US multinational companies represent almost 20% of the foreign direct investment income for the US.”
2For a more detailed discussion on different interpretations of the Hotelling model, see Anderson et al.
(1992) and Gabszewicz and Thisse (1992).
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good from either A or B and the market will be covered. For example, the unit interval can
represent an underdeveloped village and the end points can correspond to two neighboring
towns where firms A and B are located. The good could be an essential facility such as a
railway station or a post office. Thus, each town has a station or an office that is served
by one of the two firms. For this example the location in the Hotelling model represents
physical location and for any consumer in the village, the transportation cost is literally the
cost of traveling to one of the towns to use the essential facility.
On the other hand, when the outside option is sufficiently appealing, it can correspond
to an existing good while good ϕ, produced by firms A and B, can be viewed as an updated
and differentiated version of the existing good. For example, the existing good could be a
household cleaner which contains harmful toxins, while good ϕ could be an environmentally
friendly cleaner. Firms A and B specialize in producing two different types of the non-toxic
cleaner. In this example, the location represents a consumer’s taste. Consumers who are
relatively close to one of the end points prefer the product characteristics offered by the
firm located at that point and buys from that firm. However, consumers who are not very
close to either of the end points do not have a strong preference for the characteristics of the
upgraded product ϕ and continue to use the existing product. These consumers do not buy
from either A or B and as a result, the market is not covered.
Apart from the versatility of the Hotelling model, the duopoly structure of this paper
encompasses various possibilities. For example, both firms A and B could be local firms
competing in a domestic market. Alternatively, one of them could be a foreign firm, or both
could be multinationals competing in a third country.
We consider a production process where an intermediate good η is required to manu-
facture ϕ. Each firm can convert one unit of good η into one unit of good ϕ at zero cost.
Both A and B can produce η, but firm B has a lower cost due to a superior technology.
We study two contracts that naturally arise in this situation: outsourcing (firm A orders η
from firm B) and technology transfer (firm B transfers its technology to firm A). Unit-based
pricing policies are considered for both cases, where the unit price is determined through
negotiations between firms A and B. Under an outsourcing contract, firm A can place any
order with firm B at the agreed upon price. Under a technology transfer contract, firm A
uses the superior technology of firm B by paying a price for each unit of production, i.e., the
technology transfer contract is based on a unit royalty.3 To compare these two contracts, we
denote ω to be the effective unit cost of firm A in any contract. Fixing ω, we compare the
contracts for both uncovered and covered markets.
In the uncovered scenario, each firm has a local monopoly over a distinct segment of
the market ϕ. Consequently, firm B’s supply of η to firm A does not affect B’s profit
in the market ϕ. Due to this reason, outsourcing and technology transfer lead to the same
outcome. For any ω, both firms and all consumers are indifferent between these two contracts.
Moreover, compared to the situation of no contracts, each of these contracts is weakly Pareto
improving: each contract makes both firms better off, some consumers better off and no
consumers worse off.
Under covered markets, the interaction between firms A and B in the market ϕ is strategic
3We consider unit pricing policies for outsourcing and unit royalty policies for technology transfer because
they are most frequently observed in practice. See Robinson and Kalakota (2004) and Vagadia (2007) for
evidence on outsourcing and Mendi (2005), Nagaoka (2005) and Vishwasrao (2007) for technology transfer.
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in that the price set by a firm affects the market share and profit of its rival. Due to this
strategic aspect, outsourcing and technology transfer contracts generate different incentives
for any firm. We show that this difference alters the strategic interaction between firms and
has important implications on prices.
Specifically we show that compared to the case of no contracts, prices never rise under
outsourcing while this is not necessarily the case under technology transfer. There are
always weakly Pareto improving outsourcing contracts that make both firms better off and
no consumers worse off. Moreover if the cost difference of firms is relatively large, there
are strictly Pareto improving outsourcing contracts that make both firms as well as all
consumers better off. On the other hand, there are no Pareto improving technology transfer
contracts: whenever both firms prefer technology transfer over no contracts, there are always
some consumers who are worse off. Finally we show that due to the difference in strategic
interaction between these two contracts, the incentives of firms and the interest of consumers
move in the opposite direction. For any ω, whenever both firms prefer one of these two
contracts, all consumers prefer the other.
When firm A outsources η to firm B, Hotelling meets Stackelberg. The volume of the
outsourcing order plays an interesting role of information transmission because it credibly
informs B that A is committed to maintain a specific market share in the market ϕ. This
market share can be viewed as the Stackelberg leader market share.4 When the unit price
ω is small, the Stackelberg market share is larger than A’s market share under no contracts.
This large share is sustained in equilibrium by a lower price of firm A. Given that A’s
commitment of Stackelberg market share is credible, B’s equilibrium price is also set lower
and prices of both firms fall. For firm B, this results in lower profit in the market ϕ compared
to the case of no contracts. So B would accept such an outsourcing contract only if it can
obtain a large supplier profit from η to compensate for its losses in the market ϕ. This will
be the case when firm B is sufficiently more efficient compared to firm A. Consequently,
when the cost difference of two firms is sufficiently large, there are strictly Pareto improving
outsourcing contracts, i.e., both firms prefer outsourcing over no contracts and both set a
lower price for ϕ that makes all consumers better off.
Under technology transfer, firm A acquires B’s superior technology and produces η itself
using this technology. As a result, firm B knows the quantity of η produced by A only
when it receives its payments for technology transfer. As these payments are received after
profits are realized in the final good market, the informational aspect in outsourcing is
completely absent under technology transfer. Moreover since firm B’s payments from the
transfer depends on the demand of A, it has an incentive to ensure that A’s demand is not
too small. This creates a distortion that raises the effective cost of B which in turn adversely
affects prices in the market ϕ. Due to this distortion, technology transfer contracts that are
preferred by both firms necessarily make some consumers worse off. Consequently, unlike the
case of outsourcing, there are no Pareto improving technology transfer contracts in relation
to the situation of no contracts. The difference between outsourcing and technology transfer
is driven by two factors: first, the information transmission and the subsequent Stackelberg
leadership effect that leads to lower prices under outsourcing is absent under technology
4When firms A and B compete in quantities as Cournot duopolists, A’s outsourcing order corresponds
to the Stackelberg leader output (see Baake et al., 1995; Chen et al., 2009). The leadership effect is indirect
under price competition: following the outsourcing order by A, equilibrium prices are formed in a way so
that A’s market share exactly equals the quantity of η it has ordered from B.
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transfer, and second, outsourcing orders are obtained upfront before firms set their prices,
so outsourcing has no distortive effect.
The existing literature has studied horizontal outsourcing (i.e., a firm outsources to its
rival) under different models of price competition such as a Hotelling duopoly (Shy and
Stenbacka, 2003),5 a duopoly with differentiated products (Chen et al., 2004) and a Bertrand
duopoly (Arya et al., 2007). It is concluded in these papers that horizontal outsourcing
is inefficient and leads to higher prices in the final good market. To a certain extent, we
obtain similar implications under technology transfer where we show that there are no Pareto
improving contracts. However, under outsourcing, we show that prices never rise and there
are always Pareto improving contracts. Thus, our result on outsourcing differs with the
conclusion of the existing literature.
This difference arises because the existing literature generally treats outsourcing and
technology transfer equivalently. Specifically, it overlooks the informational aspect of out-
sourcing which is the main focus of this paper. The information transmission in outsourcing
is driven by our presumed sequence of events. In our model, firm A places its outsourcing or-
der of η first and then prices are set in the market ϕ. The papers mentioned above implicitly
assumes an alternative sequence where the input-seeking firm places its outsourcing order
with its rival after firms set their prices in the final good market. Under this sequence, out-
sourcing does not transmit any information to the supplier firm prior to price competition.
Since outsourcing order is not received upfront, to obtain higher profit from outsourcing
the supplier has to ensure that the input-seeking firm’s demand is not too small. As a re-
sult, the distortive effect of technology transfer is present in outsourcing which explains why
outsourcing contracts are inefficient under the sequence assumed in the literature.
It can be argued that our presumed sequence is more realistic. An outsourcing order takes
time to process for reasons such as logistics. Additionally, compared to in-house production,
an outsourcing order may have to pass through more stages of inspection. These factors
will be particularly dominant if the supplier is a foreign firm, which has been a frequently
observed occurrence in recent years. Therefore, if a firm places its outsourcing order after
receiving its demand, it may not be able to meet its demand on time. For this reason, it
is natural to assume that firms negotiate and sign an outsourcing contract well in advance
before the final goods market meets. This approach is also consistent with the literature
of outsourcing under quantity competition. In these models, the input-seeking firm chooses
its outsourcing order first and then firms choose quantities in the final good market. The
Stackelberg leadership effect is direct under quantity competition: by placing an outsourcing
order with a rival firm in a Cournot duopoly, the input-seeking firm can establish itself as
the Stackelberg leader (see Baake et al., 1995; Chen et al. 2009).
This paper is also related to the literature of capacity commitments in duopolies. When
firm A places an outsourcing order with firm B, the volume of the order can be viewed as a
capacity that A builds prior to price competition. If the demand of A in the market ϕ does
not exceed its capacity, it can meet its demand at zero marginal cost. However, if the demand
exceeds the capacity, A meets the additional demand by producing η in-house that raises its
marginal cost. We show that in equilibrium, firm A’s demand exactly equals its capacity.
This implies that A does not produce η in-house and there is no unutilized capacity. Thus,
5The primary focus of Shy and Stenbacka (2003) is vertical outsourcing (i.e. firms outsource to an outside
supplier), although they consider horizontal outsourcing as well.
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an outsourcing contract in this paper is a natural quantity precommitment in the spirit of
Kreps and Scheinkman (1983). They have shown that if firms in a Bertrand duopoly can
make such commitments by building prior capacities, then prices rise to the Cournot level.
This paper presents an interesting contrast by showing that when the precommitment is
made by an input-seeking firm through an outsourcing order, prices either fall or stay the
same.
The paper is organized as follows. We present the model in Section 2. Three contractual
settings (no contracts, outsourcing and technology transfer) are studied in Section 3. We
conclude in Section 4. Most proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
2 The model
The final good market: The market for the final good ϕ is a linear city Hotelling duopoly
with two firms A and B. Firm A is located at point 0 and firm B at point 1 of the unit
interval [0, 1]. Firms compete in prices.
Consumers are uniformly distributed in [0, 1]. Any consumer buys either one unit of good
ϕ or chooses a specific outside option. Consumers receive utility V > 0 from good ϕ. The
outside option gives the utility V0 < V. Therefore, a consumer who does not purchase good
ϕ from either A or B obtains utility V0.
The unit cost of transportation is τ > 0. For a consumer at location x ∈ [0, 1], the
transportation cost to travel to firm A is τx, while the cost to travel to firm B is τ(1− x).
A consumer who buys one unit of good ϕ from either A or B gets utility V, pays the price
and incurs the cost of transportation.
Let pA, pB ≥ 0 be the prices set by firms A, B and denote p ≡ (pA, pB). Given any p, a
consumer has the set of purchasing options C = {A,B, 0} where
A ≡ [buy ϕ from A], B ≡ [buy ϕ from B] and 0 ≡ [choose the outside option]
For z ∈ C, the net utility of a consumer at location x ∈ [0, 1] is
upx(z) =

V − pA − τx if z = A
V − pB − τ(1− x) if z = B
V0 if z = 0
(1)
For any p, a consumer at location x chooses z ∈ C to maximize upx(z). We shall consider two
alternative scenarios:
(i) The case of the covered market where all consumers will purchase good ϕ from either
A or B.
(ii) The case of the uncovered market where some consumers will not purchase ϕ from A
or B and will choose the outside option.
Whether the market will be covered or not depends on the utility from the outside option
V0. If V0 is sufficiently small, the market will be covered and if V0 is sufficiently large, it will
be uncovered. We shall carry out our analysis under the following alternative assumptions.
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Covered Assumption (CA) V0 = −∞
Uncovered Assumption (UA) V0 > V − τ/2
Under the covered assumption (CA), any consumer receives a large negative utility V0
from the outside option. Therefore, it is not optimal for any consumer to choose the outside
option. A consumer at location x will choose either A or B by comparing upx(A) and u
p
x(B)
from (1). Consequently, the market will be covered.
Now suppose the uncovered assumption (UA) holds. Consider the consumer who is
located exactly in the middle of the unit interval [0, 1], i.e., at x = 1/2. This consumer incurs
the same transportation cost τ/2 for traveling to either A or B. When pA = pB = 0, this
consumer obtains the same net utility V − τ/2 < V0 from A or B. Thus, even when firms set
zero prices, the consumer at x = 1/2 strictly prefers the outside option over both A and B.
Therefore, for any p, this consumer will choose the outside option. Then it follows that for
any p, there will be always some consumers located in a close neighbourhood of 1/2 who will
also prefer the outside option over both A and B. That is, there will be always an interval
[a, b] (0 ≤ a < 1/2 < b ≤ 1) such that all consumers at location x ∈ [a, b] will choose the
outside option. As a result, the market will be uncovered.
Demand of firms: Let DA(p) and DB(p) be the demand received by firms A, B when
they set prices pA, pB.
Demand under CA: Under CA, it is optimal for any consumer to choose either A or
B. It follows from (1) that upx(A) T upx(B)⇔ x S x˜(p) where
x˜(p) = (pB − pA + τ)/2τ (2)
So a consumer at location x ∈ [0, 1] chooses A if x ≤ x˜(p) and B if x > x˜(p). Observe that if
pA ≥ pB + τ, then x˜(p) ≤ 0 and all consumers choose B. On the other hand, if pB ≥ pA+ τ,
then x˜(p) ≥ 1 and all consumers choose A. If pA < pB+τ and pB < pA+τ , then 0 < x˜(p) < 1.
In that case, consumers at location x ∈ [0, x˜(p)] choose A and x ∈ (x˜(p), 1] choose B. Hence
we conclude that
(DA(p), DB(p)) =

(0, 1) if pA ≥ pB + τ
(1, 0) if pB ≥ pA + τ
(x˜(p), 1− x˜(p)) if pA < pB + τ and pB < pA + τ
(3)
Demand under UA (two local monopolies): Now suppose UA holds. From (1),
upx(A) T V0 ⇔ x S x˜A(pA) and upx(B) T V0 ⇔ x T x˜B(pB) where
x˜A(pA) = (V − V0 − pA)/τ and x˜B(pB) = 1− (V − V0 − pB)/τ (4)
If pA ≥ V − V0, then x˜A(pA) ≤ 0 and no consumer chooses A. On the other hand, if
pB ≥ V − V0, then x˜B(pB) ≥ 1 and no consumer chooses B. If both pA, pB are less than
V − V0, then x˜A(pA) > 0, x˜B(pB) < 1 and by UA,
x˜A(pA) < 1/2 < x˜B(pB) (5)
We know that under UA, the consumer located at x = 1/2 always prefers the outside option
over both A and B. Since upx(A) is decreasing and u
p
x(B) is increasing in x, it follows that all
consumers at x ∈ [1/2, 1] prefer the outside option over A and all consumers at x ∈ [0, 1/2]
prefer the outside option over B. Using this fact together with (5), we conclude:
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(i) Consumers at x ∈ [0, x˜A(pA)) choose A, so DA(p) = x˜A(pA) = (V − V0 − pA)/τ
(ii) Consumers at x ∈ (x˜B(pB), 1] choose B, so DB(p) = 1− x˜B(pB) = (V − V0 − pB)/τ
(iii) Consumers at x ∈ [x˜A(pA), x˜B(pB)] choose the outside option
Therefore, under UA, the demand received by a firm depends only on its price and does not
depend at all on the price of its rival. Accordingly, each firm i ∈ {A,B} becomes a local
monopolist. The demand that firm i receives when it sets price pi is the monopoly demand
DM(pi). Hence,
Di(p) = DM(pi) =
{
(V − V0 − pi)/τ if pi < V − V0
0 if pi ≥ V − V0 (6)
The intermediate good: An intermediate good η is required to produce ϕ. Both firms
can convert one unit of good η into one unit of good ϕ at the same constant marginal cost,
which we normalize to zero.
The constant marginal cost of production of good η is c > 0 for A and c > 0 for B. Firm
B has a superior technology for producing η, so its cost is lower, i.e., c < c. We also assume
that the costs are sufficiently small. Specifically, it is assumed that
0 < c < c < min{V − V0, τ} (7)
Observe that (7) reduces to
0 < c < c < τ under CA and 0 < c < c < V − V0 under UA (8)
The effective unit cost of η for a firm will depend on the nature of contracts that A and B
have in the intermediate good market. We consider the following possibilities:
(i) No contract between A and B
(ii) Outsourcing contract between A and B: A orders η from B
(iii) Technology transfer from B to A: firm B transfers its superior technology of producing
η to firm A
Before formally describing the three contractual situations above, it will be useful for our
analysis to introduce the Hotelling duopoly game H(cA, cB).
The Hotelling duopoly game H(cA, cB): This is the standard Hotelling duopoly game
played between firms A and B in the final good market ϕ, where the constant unit cost of
producing the intermediate good η is cA ≥ 0 for firm A and cB ≥ 0 for firm B and each
firm can transform one unit of η to one unit of ϕ at zero cost. This game has the following
stages.
Stage 1: Firms A and B simultaneously set prices pA, pB ≥ 0. For any p ≡ (pA, pB), firm i
receives the demand Di(p), which is given by (3) under CA and by (6) under UA.
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Stage 2: Observing Di(p), firms A and B simultaneously choose qA, qB ≥ 0 where
qi = the quantity of η that firm i produces in order to fulfill its demand of ϕ.
The demand fulfilling constraints are qA ≥ DA(p) and qB ≥ DB(p). If the cost of producing
η is positive for firm i, optimality requires that it produces qi = Di(p) units of η and
transforms these Di(p) units to good ϕ to fulfill its demand. If the cost is zero, it is
optimal for i to produce any qi ≥ Di(p) units of η and transform Di(p) units to good ϕ to
fulfill its demand. In either case, the payoff (profit) functions of A and B in H(cA, cB) are
ΦA(p) = (pA − cA)DA(p) and ΦB(p) = (pB − cB)DB(p).
Lemma 1 characterizes Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE) of H(cA, cB).
Lemma 1 Suppose cA, cB ∈ [0,min{V − V0, τ}). If either CA or UA holds, then H(cA, cB)
has a unique SPNE. For i ∈ {A,B}, let pi(cA, cB), Di(cA, cB) and Φi(cA, cB) be the SPNE
price, market share and profit of firm i.
(I) If UA holds, then firms A and B become two local monopolists. Firm i ∈ {A,B} sets
the monopoly price ρM(ci), receives the monopoly demand δM(ci) and obtains the monopoly
profit ψM(ci), where
ρM(ci) = (V − V0 + ci)/2, δM(ci) = (V − V0 − ci)/2τ and ψM(ci) = (V − V0 − ci)2/4τ (9)
(II) If CA holds, then pA = τ+(2cA+cB)/3, pB = τ+(cA+2cB)/3; DA = 1/2−(cA−cB)/6τ,
DB = 1/2+(cA− cB)/6τ ; ΦA = (3τ − cA+ cB)2/18τ, ΦB = (3τ + cA− cB)2/18τ. The market
is covered, i.e., DA +DB = 1.
Proof (I) Observe from (6) that under UA, firm i ∈ {A,B} chooses its price pi to maximize
its local monopolist’s profit (pi − ci)DM(pi). Since ci < V − V0, it follows from (6) that it is
optimal for firm i to set the monopoly price ρM(ci) given in (9). The expressions of monopoly
demand δM(ci) and profit ψM(ci) are immediate.
(II) See the Appendix.
3 Three contractual settings
3.1 No contracts between A and B
When there are no contracts between firms A and B in the intermediate good market η,
firm A produces η under cost c, while firm B has cost c. Accordingly, the Hotelling duopoly
game H(c, c) is played between A and B in the market ϕ.
Proposition 1 When there are no contracts between firms A and B, the Hotelling duopoly
game H(c, c) is played. This game has a unique SPNE. For i ∈ {A,B}, let p0i , D0i and Φ0i be
the SPNE price, demand and profit of firm i.
(I) If UA holds, then p0A = ρM(c), p
0
B = ρM(c); D
0
A = δM(c), D
0
B = δM(c); Φ
0
A = ψM(c),
Φ0B = ψM(c). Firms A and B become local monopolists and the market is uncovered, i.e.,
D0A +D
0
B = δM(c) + δM(c) < 1.
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(II) Denote θ ≡ (2c + c)/3 and θ ≡ (c + 2c)/3. If CA holds, then p0A = τ + θ, p0B = τ + θ;
D0A = 1/2−(c−c)/6τ, D0B = 1/2+(c−c)/6τ ; Φ0A = (3τ−c+c)2/18τ ; Φ0B = (3τ+c−c)2/18τ.
The market is covered, i.e., D0A +D
0
B = 1.
Proof Follows from Lemma 1 by taking cA = c and cB = c.
3.2 Outsourcing contract between A and B
When there is an outsourcing contract between A and B, firm A has two options of acquiring
the intermediate good η: (i) it can order η from firm B or (ii) it can produce this good itself
at cost c. We do not impose any exclusivity restriction on outsourcing contracts. That is,
firm A can order η from firm B as well as produce it in-house. Firm B produces its required
η entirely by itself at cost c.
We consider linear unit pricing contracts: firm B charges a constant price for each unit
of η that it supplies to firm A. The unit price is determined through negotiations between
firms A and B. Under outsourcing contracts, the strategic interaction between A and B is
described as follows.
Negotiation stage: In the beginning, firms A and B negotiate on the unit price ω at
which B can supply η to A. As firm A can produce η itself at unit cost c, an outsourcing
contract can lower its cost of production only if ω < c. On the other hand, as firm B’s unit
cost of η is c, it obtains a positive profit as a supplier only if ω > c. For this reason, we
restrict ω ∈ (c, c).
If firms do not agree on a price, firm A produces the required η entirely by itself at cost c
and the game H(c, c) is played in the final good market. If firms agree on a price ω ∈ (c, c),
the game ΓS(ω) is played between A and B.
The game ΓS(ω): It is an extensive form game that has the following stages.
Stage I: Firm A chooses the amount K ∈ [0, 1] of η to order6 from firm B. Firm A receives
K units of η by paying ωK to firm B and B obtains the supplier profit (ω − c)K.
Stage II: Firms A and B play the Hotelling duopoly game HK(c, c). This game has the
following stages.
Stage 1: Firms A and B simultaneously announce prices pA, pB for the final good market
ϕ. For any p ≡ (pA, pB), the demand received by firm i ∈ {A,B} is Di(p), given by (3)
under CA and (6) under UA.
Stage 2: Observing Di(p), firms A and B simultaneously choose qA, qB ≥ 0 where
qi = the quantity of η that firm i produces in order to fulfill its demand of ϕ
As A already has K units of η from stage 1, its demand fulfilling constraint is
K + qA ≥ DA(p) (10)
6Since the maximum demand that a firm can have is 1, there is no loss of generality in restrictingK ≤ 1. In
our model firms A and B negotiate on the price ω and then A chooses the outsourcing order K. Alternatively,
one can allow A and B to negotiate on both ω and K. Our qualitative conclusions remain unaltered under
this alternative.
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As firm B produces η entirely by itself, the corresponding constraint for B is
qB ≥ DB(p) (11)
Each firm fulfills its demand, profits are realized and the game terminates.
Since the unit cost of producing η is positive for each firm, by (11), optimality requires that
firm B produces qB = DB(p) units of η and transforms DB(p) units to good ϕ to fulfill
its demand. Regarding firm A, by (10), if DA(p) ≤ K (i.e. its demand does not exceed
the amount of η it has ordered from B), then it is optimal for A to choose qA = 0 (i.e. it
does not produce η in-house) and transform DA(p) units of η to ϕ. If DA(p) > K, it is
optimal to choose qA = DA(p) − K (i.e. firm A produces exactly the additional amount
of η that it needs to meet its demand) and transform DA(p) units of η to ϕ. Therefore,
qA = max{0, DA(p)−K}.
Payoffs of firms in ΓS(ω): We can write the payoffs of firms by using the optimal
values of qA, qB. Firm B’s payoff has three components: (i) revenue from market ϕ, (ii) cost
of producing qB units of η to fulfill its demand and (iii) profit from supplying K units of η
to A at price ω. Since firm B’s unit cost of η is c and qB = DB(p), its payoff is
ΠωB(K, p) = pBDB(p)− cqB + (ω − c)K = (pB − c)DB(p) + (ω − c)K (12)
Firm A’s payoff also has three components: (i) revenue from market ϕ, (ii) cost of producing
qA units of η in-house to fulfill its demand and (iii) its payment to firm B for acquiring η at
price ω. Since firm A’s unit cost of η is c and qA = max{0, DA(p)−K}, its payoff is
ΠωA(K, p) = pADA(p)−cqA−ωK =
{
pADA(p)− ωK if DA(p) ≤ K
pADA(p)− c(DA(p)−K)− ωK if DA(p) > K (13)
We determine SPNE of ΓS(ω) by backward induction. So we begin from stage II.
3.2.1 Stage II of ΓS(ω): The Hotelling duopoly game HK(c, c)
The game HK(c, c) can be viewed as a Hotelling duopoly game in which firm A has built a
“capacity” of K prior to the game.7 Specifically, in this game:
(i) Firm B has constant unit cost c.
(ii) Firm A has capacity K which is commonly known between A and B. If the demand
received by A does not exceed K, it can fulfill the demand at zero unit cost. However,
if its demand exceeds K, A has to incur the cost c for every additional unit.
Observe from (13) that for firm A, ωK is the cost of capacity K that it pays upfront to firm
B before stage II, so ωK plays no role stage II onwards. Similarly, from (12), (ω−c)K is the
profit that firm B obtains upfront before stage II and it plays no role thereafter. Ignoring
these terms, from (12), firm B’s profit in HK(c, c) is
ΦKB (p) = (pB − c)DB(p) (14)
7When K = 0, HK(c, c) becomes the standard Hotelling duopoly game H(c, c).
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From (13), firm A’s profit in HK(c, c) is
ΦKA (p) =
{
pADA(p) if DA(p) ≤ K
pADA(p)− c(DA(p)−K) = (pA − c)DA(p) + cK if DA(p) > K (15)
Therefore, firm A has unit cost zero if DA(p) ≤ K, while its effective unit cost is c > 0 if
DA(p) > K.
Lemma 2 characterizes SPNE of the Hotelling duopoly game HK(c, c). Recall that the
monopoly price, demand and profit at cost c are denoted by ρM(c), δM(c) and ψM(c). Also
recall that for i ∈ {A,B}, pi(cA, cB), Di(cA, cB) and Φi(cA, cB) denote the SPNE price,
market share and profit of firm i in the standard Hotelling game H(cA, cB).
Lemma 2 HK(c, c) has a unique SPNE that has the following properties.
(I) Under UA, firms A and B become two local monopolists. Firm B sets price ρM(c), receives
demand δM(c) and obtains profit ψM(c).
(i) If K < δM(c), then firm A sets price ρM(c), receives demand δM(c) and obtains profit
ψM(c) + cK. Firm A fully utilizes its capacity K and in addition produces δM(c) −K
units of η in-house to fulfill its demand.
(ii) If K > δM(0), then firm A sets price ρM(0), receives demand δM(0) and obtains profit
ψM(0). Firm A does not utilize K − δM(0) units of its capacity and does not produce η
in-house.
(iii) If K ∈ [δM(c), δM(0)] then firm A sets price ρ∗ := V − V0 − τK ∈ [ρM(0), ρM(c)],
receives demand exactly equal to its capacity K and obtains profit ρ∗K.
(II) Under CA
(i) If K < DA(c, c), the prices and market shares of firms are the same as in the SPNE of
H(c, c). The profits are ΦKA = ΦA(c, c) + cK and ΦKB = ΦB(c, c). Firm A fully utilizes
its capacity K and in addition produces DA(c, c) −K units of η in-house to fulfill its
demand.
(ii) If K > DA(0, c), the prices, market shares and profits of firms are the same as in the
SPNE of H(0, c). Firm A does not utilize K − DA(0, c) units of its capacity and does
not produce η in-house.
(iii) If K ∈ [DA(c, c), DA(0, c)], the prices of firms A, B are
pKA = 3τ + c− 4τK and pKB = 2τ + c− 2τK (16)
The market share of firm A is K and that of firm B is 1 − K. Firm A fully utilizes
its capacity K and does not produce η in-house. The profits are ΦKA = p
K
AK and Φ
K
B =(
pKB − c
)
(1−K).
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Proof See the Appendix.
Observe that in the game HK(c, c), firm B’s unit cost is always c. For firm A, the
minimum possible unit cost is 0 while the maximum possible unit cost is c. Therefore, in an
SPNE of HK(c, c) the maximum market share that firm A can have is DA(0, c) (its SPNE
market share in the standard Hotelling game HK(0, c)), while the minimum market share
that it can have is DA(c, c) (the corresponding market share in HK(c, c)).
Lemma 2 shows that if the capacity of firm A is too small [K < DA(c, c)], building such
a capacity gives A no strategic advantage in HK(c, c) and the game yields the same SPNE
outcome as H(c, c). On the other hand, if the capacity is too large [K > DA(0, c)], the game
results in the same SPNE outcome as H(0, c) where part of the capacity remains unutilized
(so it is clear that building such large capacity cannot be optimal for firm A). Intermediate
capacities [DA(c, c) ≤ K ≤ DA(0, c)] have a commitment value in that for these values of K,
the SPNE prices are such that the market share of A in HK(c, c) exactly equalsK. As a result,
the capacity is fully utilized and A does not produce η in-house. Under covered markets,
building such intermediate capacities indirectly establishes firm A as the Stackelberg leader.
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Figure 1: Hotelling Meets Stackelberg
Ap Ap Ap
Figure 1 above illustrates the Stackelberg effect. This figure identifies the SPNE (pKA , p
K
B )
of HK(c, c) for different values of K. Since firm B’s unit cost is fixed at c, its best response
is the same as in a standard Hotelling game, given by the line B1B2. Firm A’s unit cost
depends on its demand and its best response is a piecewise linear function that has three
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segments. If B’s price pB is relatively small, A’s best response is the same as in the standard
Hotelling game H(0, c), given by A1A2. On the other hand, if pB is relatively large, A’s best
response is the same as in H(c, c), given by A3A4. For intermediate values of pB, its best
response, A2A3, is such that the demand it receives is exactly equal to its capacity K.
Figure 1(a) corresponds to the case where K < DA(c, c). For this case, B1B2 intersects
the best response of A at the segment A3A4. The SPNE is the same as in H(c, c). Figure 1(b)
corresponds to the case where K > DA(0, c) and B1B2 intersects the best response of A at
the segment A1A2. The SPNE is the same as in H(0, c). Figure 1(c) corresponds to the case
where K ∈ [DA(c, c), DA(0, c)]. For this case B1B2 intersects the best response of A at the
intermediate segment A2A3. This is where Hotelling meets Stackelberg. The SPNE (p
∗
A, p
∗
B)
is such that firm A’s market share exactly equals its capacity K.
3.2.2 Stage I of ΓS(ω)
Now we move back to stage I of ΓS(ω) where firm A chooses its outsourcing order K ∈ [0, 1]
of η. For any such K, in stage II, the game HK(c, c) is played whose unique SPNE is given
in Lemma 2. Let ΦKA be the SPNE profit of firm A in HK(c, c). In any SPNE play of ΓS(ω),
when firm A orders K units of η from firm B in stage I, its payoff is ΦKA − ωK (its SPNE
profit in HK(c, c) net of its payment ωK that it makes to firm B). By Lemma 2, under UA,
this payoff is
ΠωA(K) =

ψM(c) + cK − ωK if K < δM(c)
ρ∗K − ωK if K ∈ [δM(c), δM(0)]
ψM(0)− ωK if K > δM(0)
(17)
Under CA, the payoff of A is
ΠωA(K) =

ΦA(c, c) + cK − ωK if K < DA(c, c)
pKAK − ωK if K ∈ [DA(c, c), DA(0, c)]
ΦA(0, c)− ωK if K > DA(0, c)
(18)
The payoff of firm B is its SPNE profit in HK(c, c) plus its input supplier profit (ω − c)K.
By Lemma 2, under UA, this payoff is
ΠωB(K) = ψM(c) + (ω − c)K (19)
Under CA, the payoff of B is
ΠωB(K) =

ΦB(c, c) + (ω − c)K if K < DA(c)(
pKB − c
)
(1−K) + (ω − c)K if K ∈ [DA(c), DA(0)]
ΦB(0, c) + (ω − c)K if K > DA(0)
(20)
To determine SPNE of ΓS(ω), in stage I, we solve the single-person decision problem of firm
A which is to choose K ∈ [0, 1] to maximize ΠωA(K) given by (17) under UA and (18) under
CA.
Recall from Proposition 1 that when there are no contracts between firms, the standard
Hotelling game H(c, c) is played. The price, demand and payoff of firm i ∈ {A,B} under no
contracts are p0i = pi(c, c), D
0
i = Di(c, c) and Φ
0
i = Φi(c, c).
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Proposition 2 For any ω ∈ (c, c), ΓS(ω) has a unique SPNE. Let K(ω) be the amount of
η that firm A orders from firm B and for i ∈ {A,B}, let pSi (ω), DSi (ω) and ΠSi (ω) be the
price, market share and payoff of firm i in the SPNE. The SPNE has the following general
properties.
(I) The demand that firm A receives in the market ϕ exactly equals the quantity of η that
it orders from firm B. Consequently firm A fully utilizes the amount of η that it orders
from B and does not produce η in-house.
(II) ΠSA(ω) is decreasing and Π
S
B(ω) is increasing in ω. Moreover Π
S
A(ω) > Φ
0
A, i.e., com-
pared to the situation of no contracts, firm A is better off.
(III) Compared to the situation of no contracts, no consumer is worse off.
The SPNE has the following specific properties.
(I) Suppose UA holds. Then for any ω ∈ (c, c), firms A and B stay local monopolists, with
A having the effective unit cost ω and B having cost c. Consequently
pSA(ω) = ρM(ω), p
S
B(ω) = ρM(c), D
S
A(ω) = δM(ω), D
S
B(ω) = δM(c),
ΠSA(ω) = ψM(ω) and Π
S
B(ω) = ψM(c) + (ω − c)δM(ω)
Consumers at location x ∈ [0, δM(ω)) buy from A, x ∈ [δM(ω), 1 − δM(c)] do not buy
and x ∈ (1 − δM(c), 1] buy from B. Compared to the situation of no contracts, both
firms are better off. Consumers at location x ∈ [0, δM(ω)) (who buy from A) are better
off and consumers at x ∈ [δM(ω), 1] (who do not buy from A) are neither better off
nor worse off.
(II) Suppose CA holds and let c− c > (3/4)τ. There is ĉ ∈ (c, c) such that
(a) If ω ∈ (c, ĉ), then K(ω) = 3/8 − (ω − c)/8τ ∈ (DA(c, c), DA(0, c)) . The market
share of firm A is K(ω) and that of firm B is 1−K(ω). The prices are
pSA(ω) = (3τ + c+ ω)/2 < p
0
A and p
S
B(ω) = (5τ + 3c+ ω)/4 < p
0
B
Consequently all consumers are better off compared to the situation of no contracts.
The payoffs are
ΠSA(ω) = p
S
A(ω)K(ω)−ωK(ω) and ΠSB(ω) =
(
pSA(ω)− c
)
(1−K(ω))+(ω − c)K(ω)
Compared to the situation of no contracts, firm A is better off. There is c˜ ∈ (c, ĉ)
such that ΠSB(ω) T Φ0B ⇔ ω T c˜, i.e., firm B is better off only if ω ∈ (c˜, ĉ).
(b) If ω ∈ [ĉ, c), then K(ω) = DA(c, c) = D0A. The prices and market shares of firms
are exactly the same as in the case of no contracts. The payoffs are
ΠSA(ω) = Φ
0
A + (c− ω)D0A and ΠSB(ω) = Φ0B + (ω − c)D0A
Compared to the situation of no contracts, both firms are better off and consumers
are neither better off nor worse off.
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(c) An outsourcing contract is strictly Pareto improving (both firms and all consumers
are better off) if ω ∈ (c˜, ĉ) and weakly Pareto improving (both firms are better off
and no consumer is worse off) if ω ∈ [ĉ, c).
(III) Suppose CA holds and let c − c ≤ (3/4)τ. Then for any ω ∈ (c, c), K(ω) = DA(c, c)
and the conclusion is the same as in (II)(b). Consequently an outsourcing contract is
weakly Pareto improving for all ω ∈ (c, c).
Proof See the Appendix.
Firm A’s outsourcing order of η is equivalent to a capacity built by A prior to price
competition. The volume of the order transmits the information to B that A commits to
maintain a specific share in the market ϕ. This commitment is credible, because following
the order, the equilibrium prices are such that A’s market share exactly equals its capacity.
Consequently, the outsourcing order indirectly establishes firm A as the Stackelberg leader
in the market ϕ.
For firm A, the unit price of building the capacity is ω. When ω is relatively large, the
Stackelberg leader market share coincides with A’s market share under no contracts. Since
ω < c, it is optimal for A to order its required η from B. However, A does not utilize its
Stackelberg leader advantage since capacity building is relatively costly. For small values of ω,
the Stackelberg leader market share is larger than A’s market share under no contracts. Here
capacity building is less expensive which enables firm A to utilize its leadership advantage.
The Stackelberg leader market share is sustained in equilibrium by a lower price of firm A.
Given that A’s commitment to maintain this share is credible, B’s equilibrium price is also
set lower enabling it to stay competitive. As a result, prices of both firms fall. For firm
B, this results in lower profit in the market ϕ compared to the situation of no contracts.
Therefore, B would accept such a situation only if it can recover its losses in the final good
market from its supplier profit, which is the case when B is sufficiently efficient compared to
A. Consequently, if the cost difference of two firms is sufficiently large (i.e., c− c > (3/4)τ),
there are strictly Pareto improving outsourcing contracts.
3.3 Technology transfer contract between A and B
When firm B transfers its superior technology to firm A, both A and B can produce the
intermediate good η at lower cost c. As in the case of outsourcing contract, we consider linear
unit pricing contracts. The unit pricing contract for technology transfer is the unit royalty
contract where the rate of royalty is denoted by r. The strategic interaction between A and
B under technology transfer is described as follows.
Negotiation stage: In the beginning, firms A and B negotiate on the unit royalty r.
Under the unit royalty contract, firm A uses the superior technology of firm B. In return, A
pays B the royalty r for each unit of η that it produces using the superior technology. So,
firm A’s effective unit cost of η is c+ r. As A can produce η itself at unit cost c, a royalty
contract can lower its cost of production only if c+ r < c or r < c− c. On the other hand,
firm B can obtain a positive revenue from technology transfer only if r > 0. So we restrict
r ∈ (0, c− c).
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To compare royalty contracts with outsourcing contracts, it will be convenient to denote
ω ≡ c + r. Then ω represents the effective unit cost of η for firm A under the superior
technology, while r = ω − c represents the unit profit of firm B from technology transfer.
Since r ∈ (0, c− c), we have ω ∈ (c, c).
If firms do not agree on a price, firm A produces the required η entirely by itself at cost c
and the game H(c, c) is played in the final good market. If firms agree on a price ω ∈ (c, c),
firm B transfers its superior technology to firm A and the game ΓT (ω) is played firms
between A and B.
Remark Observe that the interpretation of ω is the same as in outsourcing contracts. For
firm A, ω is the unit cost of obtaining η from firm B. For B, (ω − c) is the unit profit
from supplying η to A. The difference between outsourcing and technology transfer is that
under outsourcing, A chooses the quantity of η and places its order with B before firms set
their prices for the final good market ϕ. Firm B produces η using its superior technology
and supplies η to A at price ω. In contrast, under technology transfer, A uses the superior
technology to produce η itself after prices are set and its demand is known. This difference,
which is generally overlooked in the existing literature, alters the strategic interaction and
affects the prices of the final good ϕ.
The game ΓT (ω): It is an extensive form game that has the following stages.
Stage I: Firms A and B simultaneously announce prices pA, pB for the final good market
ϕ. For any p ≡ (pA, pB), the demand received by firm i ∈ {A,B} is Di(p), given by (3)
under CA and (6) under UA.
Stage II: Observing Di(p), firms A and B simultaneously choose qA, qB ≥ 0 where
qi = the quantity of η that firm i produces in order to fulfill its demand of ϕ
The demand fulfilling constraints for firms A, B are
qA ≥ DA(p) and qB ≥ DB(p) (21)
Each firm fulfills its demand, profits are realized, firm A makes its royalty payments to
firm B and the game terminates.
If firm A produces η using its pre-contract inferior technology, its unit cost is c. If it produces
η using the superior technology, its unit cost is ω < c. So it is optimal for firm A to produce
η entirely using the superior technology. Firm B’s unit cost of producing η is c > 0. Since
both ω and c are positive, by (21), optimality requires that for i ∈ {A,B}, firm i produces
qi = Di(p) units of η and transforms Di(p) units to good ϕ to fulfill its demand.
Payoffs of firms in ΓT (ω): Using optimal values of qA, qB, we can write the payoff of
each firm. Firm A’s payoff has two components: (i) revenue from market ϕ, (ii) total effective
cost of producing qA units of η to fulfill its demand. Observe that this total effective cost is
(c + r)qA = ωqA, so it includes firm A’s royalty payments to firm B. Therefore, the payoff
of firm A is
ΠωA(p) = pADA(p)− ωqA = (pA − ω)DA(p) (22)
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Firm B’s payoff has three components: (i) revenue from market ϕ, (ii) cost of producing
qB units of η to fulfill its demand and (iii) profit from technology transfer rqA = (ω − c)qA.
Since firm B’s unit cost of η is c and qi = Di(p), its payoff is
ΠωB(p) = pBDB(p)− cqB + (ω − c)qA = (pB − c)DB(p) + (ω − c)DA(p) (23)
Covered Market: From (3), under CA, DA(p)+DB(p) = 1. Using this fact in (23), the
payoff of firm B is
ΠωB(p) = (pB − c)DB(p) + (ω − c)(1−DB(p)) = (pB − ω)DB(p) + (ω − c) (24)
Since (ω − c) is a constant, from (24) it follows that under CA, firm B in effect solves the
problem of a firm that has unit cost ω. By (22), firm A has unit cost ω. Therefore, under
CA, firms A and B effectively play the Hotelling duopoly game H(ω, ω) and SPNE of ΓT (ω)
coincides with SPNE of H(ω, ω) with the only modification that firm B’s payoff has an
additional constant (ω − c).
Remark Compared to situation of no contracts, firm B’s effective unit cost increases from
c to ω. Unlike the case of outsourcing, the payments for technology transfer are not received
upfront. To obtain relatively large royalty payments from technology transfer, B has to
ensure that A’s market share in the market ϕ is not too small. As the market share of B
necessarily falls with a larger share of A, it creates a distortion that raises the effective cost
of B.
Uncovered Market: Under UA, firms A and B are two local monopolists. The demand
received by i ∈ {A,B} at price pi is DpiM , given by (6). Then by (22), firm A’s payoff is the
monopoly profit under unit cost ω, given by
ΠωA(p) = (pA − ω)DpAM (25)
So it is optimal for A to set the monopoly price ρM(ω). Then it receives the monopoly
demand δM(ω) and obtains the monopoly profit ψM(ω). From (23), firm B’s payoff is
ΠωB(p) = (pB − c)DpBM + (ω − c)DpAM (26)
Observe that the term (ω−c)DpAM above (B’s royalty revenue) does not depend on pB.When
A optimizes, its demand is δM(ω), so B’s revenue from royalty equals (ω−c)δM(ω). The first
term, (pB − c)DpBM , of (26) is B’s profit as a local monopolist in the market ϕ. Therefore,
it is optimal for B to set the monopoly price ρM(c). Then it receives demand δM(c) and
obtains the payoff ψM(c)+(ω−c)δM(ω) (monopoly profit plus revenue from royalty). Under
uncovered market, firm A’s demand does not depend on the price of firm B. Accordingly,
the two components of firm B’s payoff (profit in the market ϕ and royalty revenue) are
completely independent and firm B’s unit cost stays at c. Consequently, technology transfer
does not have a distortive effect under uncovered market.
Proposition 3 For any ω ∈ (c, c), ΓT (ω) has a unique SPNE. For i ∈ {A,B}, let pTi (ω),
DTi (ω) and Π
T
i (ω) be the price, market share and payoff of firm i in the SPNE Γ
T (ω). The
SPNE has the following properties.
(I) ΠTA(ω) > Φ
0
A, i.e., compared to the situation of no contracts, firm A is better off.
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(II) Suppose UA holds. Then for any ω ∈ (c, c), firms A and B stay local monopolists, with
A having the effective unit cost ω and B having the cost c. The prices, market shares
and payoffs are the same as in the SPNE of ΓS(ω).
(III) Suppose CA holds. The prices and market shares of firms are the same as in the SPNE
of H(ω, ω). Each firm sets the same price τ+ω and obtains the same market share 1/2.
The payoffs are ΠTA(ω) = τ/2 and Π
T
B(ω) = τ/2 + (ω − c). Compared to the situation
of no contracts, firm A is better off. There are constants c < θ < θ̂ < θ < c such that
(a) All consumers are better off if ω ∈ (c, θ) and all consumers are worse off if ω ∈
(θ, c). If ω ∈ [θ, θ], then ∃ λ(ω) ∈ (0, 1/2] such that consumers at location x ∈ [0, λ]
are better off and x ∈ (λ, 1] are worse off.
(b) ΠTB(ω) T Φ0B ⇔ ω T θ̂, i.e., firm B is better off only if ω ∈ (θ̂, c).
(c) Whenever both firms prefer technology transfer over no contracts [i.e., if ω ∈ (θ̂, c)],
there are always some consumers who prefer no contracts over technology transfer.
Consequently, there is no technology transfer contract that is Pareto improving
(i.e., making both firms as well as all consumers better off).
Proof See the Appendix.
When the market is uncovered, firms A and B are two local monopolists and there is
no strategic interaction in the market ϕ. Due to this reason, outsourcing and technology
transfer result in the same outcome.
In the case of covered markets, firm B’s profit from the market ϕ depends on its own
demand while its royalty revenue depends on the demand of firm A. Since the market size
is fixed at 1, a larger market share of B necessarily leads to a smaller market share of A.
Accordingly, there are two conflicting factors which affect B’s payoff. An increase in B’s own
market share raises its profit in the market ϕ, however, it lowers the royalty revenue that it
receives from A. For this reason, B has an incentive to ensure that A’s market share is not
too small. This has a distortive effect which causes B’s unit cost to rise to ω > c. As A’s
unit cost falls to ω < c, A has an efficiency gain while B has an efficiency loss. The resulting
effect on consumers depends on which one of these opposing factors dominates. When ω is
sufficiently small (ω < θ), the efficiency gain of A dominates, prices of both firms fall and
all consumers are better off. When ω is sufficiently large (ω > θ), the efficiency loss of B
dominates, prices of both firms rise and all consumers are worse off. For intermediate values
of ω (ω ∈ [θ, θ]), the effect on consumers is ambiguous and it depends on their location.
Consumers who are close to A (x < λ) benefit from the efficiency gain of A and therefore
are better off. In contrast, consumers who are close to B (x ≥ λ) are adversely effected by
the efficiency loss of B and are worse off.
Observe that all consumers are better off under technology transfer compared to no
contract only if ω is sufficiently small (ω < θ). However, when ω is small, B obtains a lower
revenue from royalty. For this reason, firm B prefers technology transfer over no contract
only if ω is relatively large, in which case there are always some consumers who are worse
off. This explains why there is no Pareto improving technology transfer contract.
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3.4 Outsourcing versus technology transfer
We have already shown in Proposition 3 that outsourcing and technology transfer lead to the
same outcome under uncovered markets, making both firms and all consumers indifferent
between the two. The next proposition compares these two contracts under covered markets.
Proposition 4 Suppose CA holds. Let ω ∈ (c, c). There are constants α, β, θ, θ ∈ (c, c),
satisfying α < θ < β < θ such that the following hold.
(I) If ω ∈ (c, α), both firms prefer outsourcing and if ω ∈ (β, c), both firms prefer technol-
ogy transfer. If ω ∈ [α, β], then firm A prefers technology transfer while firm B prefers
outsourcing.
(II) If ω ∈ (c, θ), all consumers prefer technology transfer and if ω ∈ (θ, c), all consumers
prefer outsourcing. If ω ∈ [θ, θ], then ∃ λ(ω) ∈ (0, 1/2] such that consumers at location
x ∈ [0, λ] prefer technology transfer while consumers at x ∈ (λ, 1] prefer outsourcing.
(III) Whenever both firms prefer a specific contract, all consumers prefer the other contract.
Specifically if ω ∈ (c, α), both firms prefer outsourcing and all consumers prefer tech-
nology transfer. If ω ∈ (β, c), both firms prefer technology transfer and all consumers
prefer outsourcing.
Proof See the Appendix.
Observe that under both outsourcing and technology transfer, ω is firm A’s effective
unit cost of obtaining η and (ω − c) is firm B’s unit profit from the market η. Comparing
the contracts by keeping ω fixed implies that the effects of cost efficiency (for firm A) and
supplier profits (for firm B) are the same across contracts.
Firm A’s payoff under technology transfer is a constant τ/2, while its payoff under out-
sourcing is decreasing in ω. Accordingly, A prefers outsourcing for relatively small values
of ω and technology transfer for relatively large values of ω. Firm B’s payoff has two com-
ponents: profit from the final good market ϕ and profit from the intermediate good market
η. We have seen that under technology transfer, there is a distortive effect that raises the
effective cost of B. As a result, the profit of B in ϕ is lower under technology transfer than
outsourcing. Therefore, if B is solely interested in the profits from the market ϕ, it would
prefer outsourcing. On the other hand, if B is only interested in the profits from the market
η, it would prefer technology transfer. This is because the profit of B from η increases with
the market share of A, which is higher under technology transfer. Consequently the two
components of B’s payoff conflict with each other. This trade-off is settled by the magnitude
of ω. When ω is relatively small, the profit from η does not contribute significantly to B’s
payoff. As a result, the effect of the market ϕ dominates and B prefers outsourcing. On
the other hand, when ω is relatively large, the profit from η contributes significantly to B’s
payoff, so B prefers technology transfer.
The preference of consumers between these two contracts depends on ω. For relatively
large values of ω, prices under outsourcing are the same as in the case of no contracts, but
prices under technology transfer exceed the no contract levels. Accordingly, all consumers
prefer outsourcing for relatively large values of ω. On the other hand, for relatively small
values of ω, prices under outsourcing may fall, but prices under technology transfer fall
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significantly below the no contract levels. Consequently all consumers prefer technology
transfer for relatively small values of ω. For intermediate values of ω, the price of firm A
falls while the price of B rises under technology transfer. As a result, the preference of
consumers depends on their location as in Proposition 3. Finally it is shown that interest
of consumers and incentives of firms conflict each other. Whenever both firms prefer one of
the two contracts, all consumers prefer the other one.
4 Concluding remarks
This paper has compared two contracts that are frequently observed in industry practices:
outsourcing and technology transfer. Departing from the existing literature, we have shown
that these two contracts generate different strategic interactions that alter incentives of
firms and have important effects on prices. Identifying the Stackelberg leadership effect in a
Hotelling duopoly model, we have shown that there are always Pareto improving outsourcing
contracts that make both firms and all consumers better off. In contrast, there are no
Pareto improving technology transfer contracts. Due to the difference in strategic interaction
between these contracts, the interest of consumers and incentives of firms move in completely
opposite directions. When firms prefer outsourcing, all consumers prefer technology transfer
and when firms prefer technology transfer, all consumers prefer outsourcing.
Appendix
We begin with Lemma A1 which will be used to prove Lemma 1.
Lemma A1 Suppose CA holds and let cA, cB < τ. Let i, j ∈ {A,B} and i 6= j. In the game
H(cA, cB):
(i) The best response of firm i to firm j’s price pj is
bci(pj) =
{
(pj + τ + ci)/2 if pj ≤ 3τ + ci
pj − τ if pj > 3τ + ci (27)
(ii) If (pA, pB) is an SPNE of H(cA, cB), then pi ≤ 3τ + cj for i, j ∈ {A,B}, i 6= j.
Proof (i) By (3), if pi ≤ pj − τ , then Di = 1 and i’s payoff is pi − ci, which is strictly
increasing in pi. If pi ≥ pj + τ, then Di = 0 and i’s payoff is zero. Therefore, to determine
best response of i, it is sufficient to consider pi ∈ [pj − τ, pj + τ ]. In that case, by (2) and
(3), Di = (pj − pi + τ)/2τ and i’s payoff is Φi = (pi − ci)(pj − pi + τ)/2τ. Since ci < τ, we
have pj + τ > ci. Hence the unconstrained maximum of Φi with respect to pi is attained at
b(pj) = (pj + τ + ci)/2 < pj + τ. The result in (27) follows by noting that b(pj) ≥ pj − τ iff
pj ≤ 3τ + cj.
(ii) Suppose (pA, pB) is an SPNE and pj > 3τ + ci. Then by (27), pi = bci(pj) = pj− τ. In
that case,Dj = 0 and firm j obtains zero payoff. Let j deviate to set the price p
′
j = pi = pj−τ .
Following this deviation, by (2) and (3), firm j will receive demand 1/2 and payoff (pj−cj)/2.
Since pj > 3τ + cj > cj, firm j’s post-deviation payoff is positive. This shows that firm j has
improved its payoff following the deviation, a contradiction.
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Proof of Lemma 1(II) Suppose CA holds. By Lemma A1(ii), to find SPNE of H(cA, cB),
it is sufficient to consider pi ≤ 3τ + ci for i ∈ {A,B}. Then by (27), the best response of A
is to set pA = (pB + τ + cA)/2 and the best response of B is to set pB = (pA + τ + cB)/2.
The system of best response equations has a unique solution where pA = τ + (2cA + cB)/3
and pB = τ + (cA + 2cB)/3. This proves (i). Parts (ii)-(iv) follow directly from (i).
Lemma A2 will be used to prove Lemma 2.
Lemma A2 Suppose CA holds. Denote p ≡ (pA, pB), g(pB) := pB + τ − 2τK, p(K) :=
4τK − τ and p(K) := 4τK − τ + c. In the game HK(c, c):
(i) DA(p) S K ⇔ pA T g(pB).
(ii) The profit of firm A is
ΦKA (p) =

pA − c+ cK if pA < pB − τ
(pA − c)(pB − pA + τ)/2τ + cK if pB − τ ≤ pA < g(pB)
pA(pB − pA + τ)/2τ if g(pB) ≤ pA ≤ pB + τ
0 if pA > pB + τ
(28)
(iii) The best response of A to B’s price pB is
bKA (pB) =

b0(pB) = (pB + τ)/2 if pB < p
g(pB) if p ≤ pB ≤ p
bc(pB) = (pB + τ + c)/2 if p < pB ≤ 3τ + c
bc(pB) = pB − τ if pB > 3τ + c
(29)
(iv) Consider the demand that firm A receives when it sets price pA = b
K
A (pB). This demand
is less than K if pB < p, more than K if pB > p and exactly equals K if p ≤ pB ≤ p.
(v) The profit of firm B is
ΦKB (p) =

pA − c if pB < pA − τ
(pB − c)(pA − pB + τ)/2τ if pA − τ ≤ pB ≤ pA + τ
0 if pB > pA + τ
(30)
(vi) The best response of B to A’s price pA is
bKB (pA) = bc(pA) =
{
(pA + τ + c)/2 if pA ≤ 3τ + c
pA − τ if pB > 3τ + c (31)
(vii) If (pA, pB) is an SPNE of H(cA, cB), then pA ≤ 3τ + c and pB ≤ 3τ + c.
Proof (i) Observe that since K ∈ [0, 1], we have pB − τ ≤ g(pB) ≤ pB + τ. It follows from
(3) that if pA ≤ pB − τ, then DA(p) = 1 ≥ K and if pA ≥ pB + τ, then DA(p) = 0 ≤ K. Now
consider pA ∈ [pB − τ, pB + τ ]. Then from (2) and (3), we have DA(p) = (pB − pA+ τ)/2τ S
K ⇔ pA T g(pB). This completes the proof of (i).
(ii) Observe from (15) that ΦKA (p) = (pA − c)DA(p) + cK if DA(p) ≥ K. The first
expression of (28) follows by noting that DA(p) = 1 ≥ K for pA < pB − τ. Since DA(p) =
(pB − pA + τ)/2τ ≥ K for pA ∈ [pB − τ, g(pB)] (by part (i)), the second expression follows.
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Again from (15), ΦKA (p) = pAD
p
A if DA(p) ≤ K. Since DA(p) = (pB− pA+ τ)/2τ ≤ K for
pA ∈ [g(pB), pB + τ ] (by part (i)), the third expression of (28) follows. The last expression
follows by noting that DA(p) = 0 ≤ K for pA > pB + τ.
(iii) It follows from (28) that ΦKA (p) is strictly increasing for pA ≤ pB − τ and it equals
zero for pA ≥ pB + τ. Therefore, to determine best response of A, it is sufficient to consider
pA ∈ [pB − τ, pB + τ ].
Let E1 = [pB − τ, g(pB)] and E2 = [g(pB), pB + τ ]. Observe from (28) that for pA ∈ E1,
firm A’s effective unit cost is c and its problem is the same as in the standard Hotelling game
H(c, cB). Taking i = A and cA = c in (27) of Lemma A1, the unconstrained maximum of
ΦKA (p) over pA ∈ E1 is attained at pA = bc(pB). Note from (27) that if pB > 3τ + c, then
bc(pB) = pB − τ. If pB ≤ 3τ + c, then bc(pB) = (pB + τ + c)/2 S g(pB) ⇔ pB T p where
p := 4τK − τ + c ≤ 3τ + c. Hence we conclude that
arg max
pA∈E1
ΦKA (p) =

g(pB) if pB < p
(pB + τ + c)/2 if p ≤ pB ≤ 3τ + c
pB − τ if pB > 3τ + c
(32)
Observe from (28) that for pA ∈ E2, firm A’s effective unit cost is 0 and its problem is the
same as in the standard Hotelling game H(0, cB). Taking i = A and cA = 0 in (27) of Lemma
A1, the unconstrained maximum of ΦKA (p) over pA ∈ E2 is attained at pA = b0(pB). Note
from (27) that if pB > 3τ, then b0(pB) = pB − τ ≤ g(pB), so the maximum is attained at
pA = g(pB). If pB ≤ 3τ, then b0(pB) = (pB + τ)/2 T g(pB)⇔ pB S p where p := 4τK − τ ≤
3τ. Hence we conclude that
arg max
pA∈E2
ΦKA (p) =
{
(pB + τ)/2 if pB ≤ p
g(pB) if pB > p
(33)
As g(pB) ∈ E1 ∩E2, choosing pA = g(pB) is feasible for both E1 and E2. Using this fact, the
result in (29) follows from (32)-(33).
(iv) It follows from (iii) that bKA (pB) > g(pB) if pB < p, b
K
A (pB) < g(pB) if pB > p and
bKA (pB) = g(pB) if p ≤ pB ≤ p. Using this fact, the result follows from (i).
(v)-(vi) Noting that firm B’s constant unit cost of η is c, (30) follows from (2) and (3),
and (31) follows from (27) by taking i = B and cB = c.
(vii) Follows from (29) and (31) by the same reasoning as the proof of Lemma A1(ii).
Proof of Lemma 2 (I) Suppose UA holds. Recall from (9) that when a monopolist has cost
c, the monopoly price, demand and profit are ρM(c) = (V −V0+c)/2, δM(c) = (V −V0−c)/2τ
and ψM(c) = (V − V0 − c)2/4τ. Noting that firm B is a local monopolist with unit cost c,
the result for B is immediate.
By (15), firm A’s profit is as follows, where DpAM = (V −V0−pA)/τ is the demand received
by a monopolist at price pA.
Φ(pA) =
{
pAD
pA
M if D
pA
M ≤ K
(pA − c)DpAM + cK if DpAM > K (34)
Observe that DpAM T K ⇔ pA S ρ∗ where ρ∗ := V − V0 − τK. If pA ≤ ρ∗, then DpAM ≥ K
and by (34), firm A solves the problem of a monopolist that has cost c. If pA ≥ ρ∗, then
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DpAM ≤ K and by (34), firm A solves the problem of a monopolist that has cost 0. Hence we
conclude that
arg max
pA≤ρ∗
Φ(pA) = min{ρ∗, ρM(c)} and arg max
pA≥ρ∗
Φ(pA) = max{ρ∗, ρM(0)} (35)
Also observe that ρ∗ T ρM(c)⇔ δM(c) T K and ρ∗ T ρM(0)⇔ δM(0) T K.
(i) Let K < δM(c) < δM(0). Then ρ
∗ > ρM(c) > ρM(0). By (35), it follows that
argmaxpA≤ρ∗ Φ(pA) = ρM(c) and argmaxpA≥ρ∗ Φ(pA) = ρ
∗. Hence it is optimal for A to set
price ρM(c). Then it receives demand δM(c) > K, produces δM(c) −K units of η in-house
and by (34), obtains the profit ψM(c) + cK.
(ii) Let K > δM(0) > δM(c). Then ρ
∗ < ρM(0) < ρM(c). By (35), it follows that
argmaxpA≤ρ∗ Φ(pA) = ρ
∗ and argmaxpA≥ρ∗ Φ(pA) = ρM(0). Hence it is optimal for A to
set price ρM(0). Then it receives demand δM(0) < K, does not produce η in-house and
K − δM(0) units of η are not utilized. By (34), A obtains the profit ψM(0).
(iii) Let K ∈ [δM(c), δM(0)]. Then ρ∗ ∈ [ρM(0), ρM(c)] and by (35), argmaxpA≤ρ∗ Φ(pA) =
argmaxpA≥ρ∗ Φ(pA) = ρ
∗. Hence it is optimal for A to set price ρ∗. Then it receives demand
exactly K and by (34), obtains the profit ρ∗K.
(II) Suppose CA holds. Using Lemma A2(vii), to find SPNE of HK(c, c), consider pA ≤
3τ + c and pB ≤ 3τ + c. From (29), firm A’s best response bKA (pB) is piecewise linear with
three segments: bc(pB) (if pB > p), b0(pB) (if pB < p) and g(pB) (if pB ∈ [p, p]). From (31),
firm B’s best response is linear, given by bc(pB). Hence any segment of b
K
A (pB) can intersect
bc(pB) at most once. It will be useful to recall that for i = 1, 2, the SPNE price and market
share of firm i in H(cA, cB) are denoted by pi(cA, cB) and Di(cA, cB).
Note that bc(pB) is the best response of A in the standard Hotelling game H(c, c). Firm
B’s best response in this game is bc(pA). By Lemma 1(II), the unique solution of the system
(pA = bc(pB), pB = bc(pA)) has pA = pA(c, c) and pB = pB(c, c).We note that pB(c, c) T p⇔
K S DA(c, c). Hence we have an SPNE with pB > p iff pB = pB(c, c) > p, which holds
iff K < DA(c, c) (see Figure 1(a)). For this case, firm A fully utilizes its capacity K and
moreover produces DA(c, c)−K units of η in-house to meet its demand.
Next observe that b0(pB) is the best response of A in the standard Hotelling game H(0, c).
Firm B’s best response in this game is bc(pA). By Lemma 1(II), the unique solution of
the system (pA = b0(pB), pB = bc(pA)) has pA = pA(0, c) and pB = pB(0, c). We note that
pB(0, c) S p ⇔ K T DA(0, c). Hence we have an SPNE with pB < p iff pB = pB(0, c) < p,
which holds iff K > DA(0, c) (see Figure 1(b)). For this case, firm A does not utilize
K −DA(0, c) units of its capacity and does not produce η in-house.
Finally observe that the unique solution of (pA = g(pB), pB = bc(pA)) has pA = 3τ + c−
4τK and pB = 2τ + c−2τK. Note that 2τ + c−2τ T p⇔ K S DA(0, c) and 2τ + c−2τK S
p⇔ K T DA(c, c). Hence we have an SPNE with pB ∈ [p, p] iff pB = 2τ + c− 2τK ∈ [p, p],
which holds iff K ∈ [DA(c, c), DA(0, c)] (see Figure 1(c)). For this case, firm A’s SPNE
market share exactly equals its capacity K. It fully utilizes its capacity and does not produce
η in-house.
The results (II)[(i)-(iii)] of Lemma 2 follow from the conclusions of the last three para-
graphs.
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Proof of Proposition 2 We prove the specific properties (I)-(III) of Proposition 2. The
general properties will follow directly from the specific properties.
(I) Suppose UA holds. To determine SPNE of HK(c, c), we solve the problem of firm A
in stage 1 where A chooses K ∈ [0, 1] to maximize ΠωA(K) given in (17). Observe that (i)
since ω < c, ΠωA(K) is strictly increasing for K ≤ δM(c) and (ii) since ω > c > 0, it is strictly
decreasing for K ≥ δM(0). So it is sufficient to consider K ∈ [δM(c), δM(0)]. Then by (17),
ΠωA(K) = ρ
∗K − ωK = (V − V0 − ω − τK)K
whose unique maximizer is attained at K = δM(ω) := (V − V0 − ω)/2τ ∈ (δM(c), δM(0)).
Consequently the price set by A in the market ϕ is ρM(ω) and A obtains ψM(ω). Since B’s
cost is c, it sets price ρM(c), receives demand δM(c) and obtains payoff ψM(c)+(ω−c)δM(ω)
(profit from ϕ plus profit from A’s order of K = δM(ω)). As ω < c, we have ρM(ω) < ρM(c).
Hence consumers who buy from A are better off. All other consumers are neither better off
nor worse off.
(II) Suppose CA holds. Here we solve the problem of firm A in Stage 1 where A chooses
K ∈ [0, 1] to maximize ΠωA(K) given in (18). As in the last case, ΠωA(K) is strictly increasing
for K ≤ DA(c, c) and strictly decreasing for K ≥ DA(0, c). So it is sufficient to consider
K ∈ [DA(c, c), DA(0, c)]. Then by (16) and (18),
ΠωA(K) = p
K
AK − ωK = (3τ + c− ω − 4τK)K.
Since τ > c > ω, we have 3τ + c − ω > 0. Hence the unconstrained maximum of ΠωA(K)
is attained at Θ(ω) := 3/8 − (ω − c)/8τ < DA(0, c) = 1/2 + c/6τ. Therefore, over K ∈
[DA(c, c), DA(0, c)], the maximizer of Π
ω
A(K) is
K(ω) = min{Θ(ω), DA(c, c)} (36)
Comparing Θ(ω) with DA(c, c) = 1/2− (c− c)/6τ , we have
Θ(ω) T DA(c, c)⇔ ω S ĉ where ĉ ≡ 4c/3− c/3− τ (37)
Observe that (i) c− ĉ = τ + c/3− c/3 > 0 and (ii) ĉ− c = (4/3) [c− c− (3/4)τ ] . Hence
ĉ T c⇔ c− c T (3/4)τ (38)
From (36), (37) and (38), we conclude that
(1) If c− c ≤ (3/4)τ, then K(ω) = DA(c, c) for all ω ∈ (c, c).
(2) If c − c > (3/4)τ, then (i) K(ω) = Θ(ω) for ω ∈ (c, ĉ) and (ii) K(ω) = DA(c, c) for
ω ∈ [ĉ, c).
The results of (II)(b) and (III) of Prop 2 follow from (1) and (2)(ii) above.
To prove (II)(a) of Prop 2, observe from (2)(i) above that if c−c > (3/4)τ and ω ∈ (c, ĉ),
then K(ω) = Θ(ω) ∈ (DA(c, c), DA(0, c)) where Θ(ω) = 3/8 − (ω − c)/8τ. From Lemma
2(iii), it follows that the market share of firm A is Θ(ω), while the share of B is 1 − Θ(ω).
Taking K = Θ(ω) in (16), it follows that
pSA(ω) = (3τ + c+ ω)/2 and p
S
B(ω) = (5τ + 3c+ ω)/4.
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Note from Prop 1(II) that under no contracts, the prices are
p0A = τ + θ and p
0
B = τ + θ where θ ≡ (2c+ c)/3 and θ ≡ (c+ 2c)/3.
As ω < ĉ, we have p0A − pSA(ω) = (ĉ− ω)/2 > 0 and p0B − pSB(ω) = (ĉ− ω)/4 > 0. Hence all
consumers are better off.
The payoffs of the firms are obtained from (18) and (20) by using the values of pSA, p
S
B
and taking K = Θ(ω). Note from (18) that since ω < c, firm A can be better off compared
to the case of no contracts by simply choosing K = DA(c, c). Therefore, under its optimal
choice K(ω), it must be better off. The payoff of B is
ΠSB(ω) = (5τ + ω − c)2/32τ + (ω − c)(3τ + c− ω)/8τ (39)
which is strictly increasing in ω. Recall from Prop 1 that under no contracts, B obtains
Π0B = (3τ + c− c)2/18τ. Hence ΠSB(ω)−Π0B is strictly increasing in ω. Note that since τ > c
and c− c > (3/4)τ , we have
ΠSB(c)− Π0B = (27τ − 4c+ 4c)[(3/4)τ − c+ c]/72τ < 0 and
ΠSB(ĉ)− Π0B = 2(3τ − c+ c)[c− c− (3/4)τ ]/9τ > 0.
Hence ∃ c˜ ∈ (0, ĉ) such that ΠSB(ω) T Π0B ⇔ ω T c˜. This completes the proof of II(a). Part
(II)(c) follows from (II)(a) and (b).
Proof of Proposition 3 We prove parts (II) and (III). Part (I) follows from (II) and (III).
(II) Suppose UA holds. We have already proved in the main text before the statement of
Prop 3 that under UA, it is optimal for A to set price ρM(ω). Then it receives demand δM(ω)
and obtains payoff ψM(ω). It is optimal for B to set price ρM(ω). Then it receives demand
δM(c) and obtains payoff ψM(c) + (ω − c)δM(ω). Noting that the prices and the payoffs are
same as in the SPNE of ΓS(ω), the proof of (II) is complete.
(III) Suppose CA holds. From (22) and (24) it follows that under CA, SPNE prices and
market shares of ΓT (ω) coincide with SPNE of game H(ω, ω). Taking cA = ω and cB = ω in
Lemma 1, the prices and market shares are obtained. Using the SPNE prices and market
shares, the payoffs are obtained from (22) and (24). Now we prove results (a)-(c).
(III)(a) Recall from Prop 1 that when there are no contracts, the SPNE prices under CA
are p0A = τ + θ and p
0
B = τ + θ where c < θ < θ < c with
θ ≡ (2c+ c)/3 and θ ≡ (c+ 2c)/3 (40)
The SPNE prices in ΓT (ω) are pTA(ω) = p
T
B(ω) = τ + ω. Therefore, if ω ∈ (c, θ), then
pTi (ω) < p
0
i for i ∈ {A,B} and all consumers prefer technology transfer over no contracts. If
ω ∈ (θ, c), pTi (ω) > p0i for i ∈ {A,B} and all consumers prefer no contracts over technology
transfer.
If ω ∈ [θ, θ], then pTA(ω) ≤ p0A and pTB(ω) ≥ p0B. Note that in ΓT (ω), firm A’s SPNE
market share is 1/2 > D0A where D
0
A = DA(c, c) is the SPNE market share of firm A under
no contracts. Consider the consumers at x ∈ [0, D0A]. In both cases (i.e., no contracts and
ΓT (ω)), they buy from firm A. As pTA(ω) ≤ p0A, these consumers are better off in ΓT (ω). Next
consider the consumers at x ∈ [1/2, 1]. In both cases they buy from firm B. As pTB(ω) ≥ p0B,
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they are worse off in ΓT (ω). Finally consider any consumer at x ∈ [D0A, 1/2). When there is
no contract, such a consumer buys from firm B to obtain the net utility
U0x = V − p0B − τ(1− x) = V − (τ + θ)− τ(1− x)
In ΓT (ω), this consumer buys from A to obtain the net utility
UTx = V − pSA − τx = V − (τ + ω)− τx
Hence UTx −U0x T 0⇔ x S λ(ω) := 1/2−(ω−θ)/2τ. Since ω ≥ θ, we have λ(ω) ≤ 1/2. Since
D0A = 1/2− (c− c)/6τ, from (40) we have λ(ω)−D0A = (θ− ω)/2τ ≥ 0 (since ω ≤ θ). Thus
λ(ω) ∈ [D0A, 1/2]. We conclude that consumers at x ∈ [D0A, λ] prefer technology transfer
while consumers at x ∈ (λ, 1/2) prefer no contracts. Since consumers at x ∈ [0, D0A) prefer
technology transfer and x ∈ [1/2, 1] prefer no contracts, the proof of (III)(a) is complete.
(III)(b) Note that ΠT (ω) = τ/2+ (ω− c) and Φ0B = (3τ + c− c)2/18τ. Denoting f(ω) :=
ΠT (ω)− Φ0B, note that f(ω) is increasing, f(c) = −(c− c)(6τ + c− c)/18τ < 0 and f(c) =
(c− c)(12τ − c + c)/18τ > 0. Hence ∃ θ̂ ∈ (c, c) such that ΠT (ω) T Φ0B ⇔ ω T θ̂. Standard
computations show that θ̂ ≡ θ + (c − c)2/18τ. Therefore, θ̂ > θ. Comparing θ̂ with θ from
(40), we have θ − θ̂ = (c− c)(6τ + c− c)/18τ > 0 proving that θ < θ̂ < θ.
(III)(c) Follows from parts (a) and (b).
Lemma A3 will be used to prove Proposition 4.
Lemma A3 Suppose CA holds. Let ω ∈ (c, c). There are constants α, β ∈ (c, c) such that
(I) ΠTA(ω) T ΠSA(ω)⇔ ω T α.
(II) ΠTB(ω) T ΠSB(ω)⇔ ω T β.
Proof Denote σ := c − c and observe that σ < τ. Also for i ∈ {A,B} we denote ∆i(ω) :=
ΠTi (ω)−ΠSi (ω). We prove the lemma by showing that there are constants α, β ∈ (c, c) such
that (I) ∆A(ω) T 0⇔ ω T α and (II) ∆B(ω) T 0⇔ ω T β.
(I) Recall that ΠTA(ω) = τ/2 for all ω ∈ (c, c) (Prop 3) and ΠSA(ω) is strictly decreasing
in ω (Prop 2). Hence ∆A(ω) is strictly increasing in ω. To determine Π
S
A(ω), we consider
the following possible cases where ĉ ≡ 4c/3− c/3− τ.
Case 1 σ > (3/4)τ :
Subcase 1(a) ω ∈ (c, ĉ): For this case, from Prop 2, we have
ΠSA(ω) = (p
S
A − ω)K(ω) = (3τ + c− ω)2/16τ, so that ∆A(ω) = τ/2− (3τ + c− ω)2/16τ
Observe that ∆A(c) = −τ/16 < 0 and ∆A(ĉ) = [2σ2 − (3τ − 2σ)2]/18τ. Hence ∆A(ĉ) T 0⇔
σ T 3(2−√2)τ/2. We have the following two possibilities.
(i) If 3(2 − √2)τ/2 < σ < τ, then ∆A(ĉ) > 0. Since ∆A(c) < 0, ∃ α̂ ∈ (c, ĉ) such that
∆A(ω) T 0⇔ ω T α̂. Standard computations show that
α̂ ≡ (3− 2
√
2)τ + c (41)
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(ii) If (3/4)τ < σ ≤ 3(2−√2)τ/2, then ∆A(ĉ) ≤ 0. Hence ∆A(ω) < 0 for all ω ∈ (c, ĉ).
Subcase 1(b) ω ∈ [ĉ, c): For this case K(ω) = DA(c, c) and ΠSA(ω) = Φ0A + (c − ω)D0A =
(3τ − σ)2/18τ + (c− ω)(3τ − σ)/6τ. Hence we have
∆A(ω) = τ/2− (3τ − σ)2/18τ − (c− ω)(3τ − σ)/6τ
Note that ∆A(c) = σ(6τ − σ)/18τ > 0. Noting that ∆A(ω) is continuous, from the last case
we know that ∆A(ĉ) T 0⇔ σ T 3(2−
√
2)τ/2. Again we consider two possibilities.
(i) If 3(2−√2)τ/2 < σ < τ, then ∆A(ĉ) > 0. Hence ∆A(ω) > 0 for all ω ∈ [ĉ, c).
(ii) If (3/4)τ < σ ≤ 3(2−√2)τ/2, then ∆A(ĉ) ≤ 0. Since ∆A(c) > 0, ∃ α˜ ∈ (ĉ, c) such that
∆A(ω) T 0⇔ ω T α˜. Standard computations show that
α˜ ≡ 2cτ/(3τ − σ)− σ(c+ c)/3(3τ − σ) + c/3. (42)
Case 2 σ ≤ (3/4)τ : For this case, by Prop 2, ΠSA(ω) and ∆A(ω) are the same as in Subcase
1(b) for all ω ∈ (c, c). From Subcase 1(b), ∆A(c) > 0. Noting that ∆A(c) = −σ(3τ−σ)/18τ <
0, we conclude that ∃ α˜ ∈ (c, c) [given in (42)] such that ∆A(ω) T 0⇔ ω T α˜.
Define
α :=
{
α̂ if 3(2−√2)τ/2 < σ < τ
α˜ if σ ≤ 3(2−√2)τ/2 (43)
Using (43), for 3(2−√2)τ/2 < σ < τ, the result follows from Subcases [1(a)(i)]-[1(b)(i)], for
(3/4)τ < σ ≤ 3(2−√2)τ/2, it follows from Subcases [1(a)(ii)]-[1(b)(ii)] and for σ ≤ (3/4)τ,
from Case 2.
(II) Recall from Prop 3 that ΠTB(ω) = τ/2+(ω−c) for all ω ∈ (c, c). To determine ΠSB(ω),
we consider the following possible cases.
Case 1 σ > (3/4)τ :
Subcase 1(a) ω ∈ (c, ĉ): For this case, by Prop 2 and (39), we have
ΠSB(ω) = (5τ − c+ ω)2/32τ + (ω − c)[3/8− (ω − c)/8τ ] and
∆B(ω) = τ/2 + (ω − c)[5/8 + (ω − c)/8τ ]− (5τ − c+ ω)2/32τ
Note that ∆B(ω) is increasing in ω. Now observe that ∆B(ĉ) = [(τ + 2σ)
2 − 13τ 2]/24τ <
(9τ 2 − 13τ 2)/24τ < 0 (since σ < τ). Hence ∆B(ω) < 0 for all ω ∈ (c, ĉ).
Subcase 1(b) ω ∈ [ĉ, c): For this case, by Prop 2, we have ΠSB(ω) = Φ0B + (ω − c)D0B =
(3τ + σ)2/18τ + (ω − c)(3τ + σ)/6τ, so that
∆B(ω) = τ/2 + (ω − c)(1/2 + σ/6τ)− (3τ + σ)2/18τ
Note that ∆B(ω) is increasing in ω. We know from the last case that ∆B(ĉ) < 0. Observing
that ∆B(c) = σ(3τ + 2σ)/18τ > 0, we conclude that ∃ β ∈ (ĉ, c) such that ∆B(ω) T 0 ⇔
ω T β. Standard computations show that
β ≡ 2cτ/(3τ + σ) + σ(c+ c)/3(3τ + σ) + c/3 (44)
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Case 2 σ ≤ (3/4)τ : For this case, by Prop 2, ΠSB(ω) and ∆B(ω) are the same as in
Subcase 1(b) for all ω ∈ (c, c). From Subcase 1(b), we know that ∆B(c) > 0. Noting that
∆B(c) = −σ(6τ + σ)/18τ < 0, we conclude that ∃ β ∈ (c, c) [given in (44)] such that
∆B(ω) T 0⇔ ω T β.
The result for σ > (3/4)τ follows from Subcases 1(a)-(b) and for σ ≤ (3/4)τ, it follows
from Case 2.
Proof of Proposition 4 (I) We prove (I) from Lemma A3 by showing that α < β. Denote
σ := c− c. First let σ > 3(2−√2)τ/2 > (3/4)τ. Then by Case 1 of the proof Lemma A3(II),
β > ĉ and by subcases [1(a)(ii)]-[1(b)(ii)] and (43) of the proof of Lemma A3(I), α = α̂ < ĉ.
Hence β > α. Next consider σ ≤ 3(2−√2)τ/2. Then by (43), α = α˜. By (42) and (44) we
have β − α˜ = σ(9τ 2 + σ2)/3(9τ 2 − σ2) > 0.
(II) To prove (II), we consider the following possible cases.
Case 1 σ > (3/4)τ :
Subcase 1(a) ω ∈ (c, ĉ): For this case, from Prop 2, the SPNE prices in ΓS(ω) are
pSA(ω) = (3τ + c+ ω)/2 and p
S
B(ω) = (5τ + 3c+ ω)/4.
From Prop 3, the SPNE prices in ΓT (ω) are pTA(ω) = p
T
B(ω) = τ +ω. Hence p
S
A(ω)−pTA(ω) =
(τ + c − ω)/2 > 0 and pSB(ω) − pTB(ω) = (τ + 3c − 3ω)/4 T 0 ⇔ ω S τ/3 + c. Note from
(37) that ĉ ≡ 4c/3− c/3− τ. Hence (τ/3 + c)− ĉ = (4/3)(τ + c− c) > 0. Therefore, for all
ω ∈ (c, ĉ), we have ω < (τ/3 + c) and hence that pSB(ω) > pTB(ω). Consequently for this case
all consumers prefer technology transfer over outsourcing.
Subcase 1(b) ω ∈ [ĉ, c): Note from Prop 2 that for this case the SPNE prices in ΓS(ω) are
the same as in the case of no contracts. Therefore, comparing outsourcing and technology
transfer for consumers is the same as comparing technology transfer with no contracts and
we can use the results of Prop 3 (III)(a).
Since θ = (2c + c)/3 and ĉ = 4c/3 − c/3 − τ, we have θ − ĉ = τ + c − c > 0, i.e.,
θ > ĉ. From Prop 2(III)(a), it then follows that (i) if ω ∈ [ĉ, θ), then all consumers prefer
technology transfer over outsourcing, (ii) if ω ∈ (θ, c), then all consumers prefer outsourcing
over technology transfer and (iii) if ω ∈ [θ, θ], there is λ(ω) ∈ (0, 1/2] such that consumers
at x ∈ [0, λ] prefer technology transfer and x ∈ (λ, 1] prefer outsourcing. Combining the
conclusions of Subcases 1(a)-(b), the proof for the case of σ > (3/4)τ is complete.
Case 2 σ ≤ (3/4)τ : For this case, for all ω ∈ (c, c), the SPNE prices in ΓS(ω) are the
same as in the case when there are no contracts. The result then follows directly from Prop
3(III)(a).
(III) The result will follow from (I)-(II) if we can show that α < θ < β < θ. Note from
(43) that if σ > 3(2 − √2)τ/2 > (3/4)τ, then α = α̂ < ĉ. Since θ > ĉ, for this case, we
have θ > α. Next consider σ ≤ 3(2 − √2)τ/2. Then by (43), α = α˜. By (42) we have
θ− α˜ = σ2/3(3τ − σ) > 0. From (44) and (40), it follows that θ− β = σ2/3(3τ + σ) > 0 and
β − θ = τσ/(3τ + σ) > 0. This completes the proof of Proposition 4.
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